What Counts as Abuse Under Family Code 6203: What Does and Does Not Qualify for a California Domestic Violence Restraining Order

By Matthew Barhoma, Esq. — California State Bar No. 319339 | Last updated: November 2026

Under California law, “abuse” for a domestic violence restraining order means any of four things: intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury; sexual assault; placing someone in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or engaging in any conduct a court could prohibit under Family Code section 6320 — which includes stalking, threatening, harassing, destroying property, unwanted contact, and “disturbing the peace of the other party,” defined as conduct that destroys the other person’s mental or emotional calm, including coercive control. Family Code section 6203(b) states that abuse is not limited to physical injury or assault. It does not have to be recent, it does not have to be a crime, and it does not have to be witnessed; the petitioner must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. But the definition has limits: accidents, self-defense, ordinary arguments, a single upsetting message, and conduct with a legitimate purpose are not abuse, and California appellate courts have reversed restraining orders that rested on them. Whether the conduct alleged crosses the statutory line is the question most contested domestic violence restraining order hearings in California are actually about — and, for a person who has been served, it is the first defense to examine. Call (888) 808-2179 for a confidential consultation.

What counts as abuse: at a glance

The law in one paragraph

Two statutes define abuse together. Family Code § 6203 gives the four-part definition and says abuse is not limited to physical injury. Its fourth category incorporates Family Code § 6320, the list of conduct a court may enjoin, which ends with “disturbing the peace of the other party” and, since 2021, defines that phrase to include coercive control. The abuse must be directed at a person in one of the relationships listed in Family Code § 6211 — see Who Can Get a Domestic Violence Restraining Order. A temporary order may issue on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” from the petitioner’s declaration alone (§ 6300), and the order after hearing requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and the time since the last act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative (§ 6301(d)). The statute pages reproduce the full text; this page is about how the words apply to what actually happens between people.

Category one: physical violence and attempted violence

Intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury is abuse under § 6203(a)(1). This is the category everyone recognizes, and three features of it are regularly misunderstood.

No injury is required. “Attempt” is in the statute. A swing that misses, a shove that is blocked, a thrown phone that hits the wall — each is an attempt to cause bodily injury. A petitioner does not need a bruise or a hospital record, and a respondent cannot defend on the ground that no one was hurt.

No serious injury is required. “Bodily injury” is unqualified. A grabbed arm that left a red mark is bodily injury. This is a lower threshold than the “traumatic condition” a prosecutor must prove for a felony under Penal Code § 273.5, which is one reason a restraining order can issue on facts that never result in a criminal charge.

Recklessness is enough. The statute reaches conduct undertaken with conscious disregard of a substantial risk of injury, not only conduct meant to hurt. Driving dangerously with a partner in the car during an argument, or shoving past someone at the top of a staircase, can qualify without intent to injure. Accidental contact — bumping into someone in a hallway, an elbow during a struggle over a phone the other person initiated — is neither intentional nor reckless and is not abuse.

Self-defense is not abuse. Family Code § 6305 forbids a mutual restraining order unless the court finds that both parties acted as primary aggressors and neither acted primarily in self-defense. A person who pushes an attacker away has not committed abuse. In contested cases where both parties were physical, the court must decide who was the primary aggressor, using the factors in Penal Code § 836(c)(3): the history of domestic violence between the parties, the threats that created fear, and whether either acted in self-defense.

What this looks like in practice. A husband who grabs his wife by the wrists during an argument and leaves marks has committed abuse. A woman who throws a glass at her partner and misses has committed abuse. A man who, while his girlfriend is hitting him, holds her arms to stop her has not — but he should expect to have to prove it, because the petition will describe him as the aggressor.

Category two: sexual assault

Sexual assault within a domestic relationship is abuse under § 6203(a)(2), and the Family Code does not require a police report, a criminal charge, or a conviction. Marriage is not a defense; spousal rape has been a crime in California for decades and is abuse under the DVPA. Sexual coercion short of force — compelling sexual conduct through threats or intimidation — may also qualify as coercive control under § 6320(c)(4), which covers compelling a person “by force, threat of force, or intimidation” to engage in conduct from which they have a right to abstain.

Category three: threats that cause reasonable fear of serious injury

Placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury, to themselves or to another, is abuse under § 6203(a)(3). Each element has a job.

The fear must be reasonable — an objective test. The question is whether a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would fear serious injury, and the petitioner’s position includes the history between the parties. “You’ll regret this” from a partner who has never been violent is different from the same words from one who put the petitioner in the hospital last year.

The feared injury must be imminent and serious. A vague statement about something happening someday is weaker under this category than a raised fist or a hand on a kitchen knife during an argument. But a threat that fails this category may still be abuse under § 6320(a), which lists “threatening” without qualifiers. In Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, the Court of Appeal reversed a trial judge who had effectively required the petitioner to prove she feared physical injury, holding that threats are abuse under § 6320(a) whether or not the petitioner feared being hurt, and that the judge had taken too limited a view of the conduct the DVPA covers.

Threats against others count. “To that person or to another” means a threat to harm the petitioner’s child, parent, sibling, or new partner is abuse of the petitioner.

What this looks like in practice. Telling a partner “if you leave, I’ll kill you” is abuse. Standing over a partner during an argument with a clenched fist is abuse. Texting a former partner “I know where your mother lives” after a history of violence is abuse under both § 6203(a)(3) and § 6320(a). A sarcastic “I could strangle you” over a forgotten errand, from a partner with no history of violence, in a relationship both parties describe as otherwise healthy, is not — though a respondent should not assume a judge will see it that way without context.

Category four: everything a court could enjoin under § 6320

The fourth category, § 6203(a)(4), is where most contested cases live. It makes abuse of any behavior “that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” The conduct need not have been enjoined already; the test is whether a court could enjoin it. The list in § 6320(a) is long, and the last item on it — disturbing the peace — has its own statutory definition.

Stalking, following, and showing up

“Stalking” in § 6320(a) does not carry the Penal Code § 646.9 requirement of a credible threat; following a former partner, waiting outside their work, driving past their home repeatedly, or appearing at places they frequent is enjoinable conduct and therefore abuse, whether or not it would support a criminal charge.

Harassing and unwanted contact

“Harassing,” “telephoning,” and “contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise” are three separate items in § 6320(a). Together they make persistent unwanted communication abuse. The leading case is Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, in which a former boyfriend kept texting, emailing, and calling with messages carrying sexual innuendo after being told to stop, then came to the petitioner’s home and refused to leave. There was no violence and no explicit threat. The Court of Appeal affirmed the restraining order: the conduct disturbed her peace and was abuse. Three points follow from Burquet and the statute’s text.

Being told to stop matters. Communication a person has asked to end, and that continues, is the core of this category. Volume matters less than persistence after refusal.

Indirect contact counts. Messages passed through friends, family, or the children; comments posted where the petitioner will see them; “accidental” encounters arranged through mutual acquaintances — § 6320(c) says the conduct may be committed “indirectly, including through the use of a third party.”

Content need not be threatening. Apologies, declarations of love, and requests to talk are abuse when they continue after the recipient has said no. The respondent who says “I was only trying to apologize” has described the conduct, not excused it.

Destroying property and harming pets

Destroying personal property is listed in § 6320(a). Punching a hole in a wall, breaking a phone, slashing tires, or throwing a partner’s belongings out of the house is abuse. Threatening, hurting, or taking a pet is enjoinable under § 6320(a) and (b), and the court may award exclusive possession of the animal to the petitioner.

Impersonation

Credibly impersonating someone under Penal Code § 528.5 — creating a fake social-media account in a partner’s name, for example — or falsely personating them under § 529 is listed in § 6320(a) and is abuse.

Disturbing the peace: the catch-all

Section 6320(c) defines “disturbing the peace of the other party” as conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party, committed directly or indirectly, by any means including telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, and other electronic technologies. The definition comes from In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, where a former husband’s accessing and disclosing his ex-wife’s private emails was held to be potentially abuse; the Legislature adopted the court’s words in 2020.

Conduct courts have held disturbs the peace includes reading and disclosing a partner’s private emails (Nadkarni); downloading a spouse’s text messages and disclosing them in court filings and to others, regardless of whether they were lawfully obtained (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416); distributing a surveillance report about a partner to her family and coworkers (Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571); persistent unwanted contact after a breakup (Burquet); sending a spouse a mock-suicide video (Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833); repeatedly calling the police for welfare checks on a co-parent to harass them (Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583); sending harassing emails to a spouse’s business contacts (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080); and abusing one parent in front of the children, which disturbs the children’s peace as well (K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114).

Two features of the test matter in every case. It is judged from the petitioner’s perspective, not a hypothetical reasonable person’s: in Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that an objective standard applies. And it is judged on the totality of the circumstances: a single message read in isolation may look harmless, and the same message as the fortieth in a series after a request to stop may not.

Coercive control

Since January 1, 2021, § 6320(c) has defined disturbing the peace to include coercive control: “a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” The statute lists five non-exhaustive examples.

Isolation — cutting the person off from friends, relatives, or other sources of support. Forbidding visits, monitoring or confiscating the phone to prevent contact, creating scenes until the person stops seeing people, moving the family somewhere the person knows no one.

Deprivation of basic necessities — withholding food, medicine, a place to sleep, or the means to get them.

Controlling, regulating, or monitoring movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services. Tracking location by phone or vehicle, demanding passwords, reading messages, controlling the car keys, requiring an account of every dollar, taking the person’s paycheck, refusing access to the bank account, preventing the person from working, interfering with medical care or legal help. The 2026 amendment adds internet-connected devices — smart locks, cameras, thermostats, vehicle apps — to the means expressly covered.

Compelling conduct through force, threat, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or suspected immigration status. Forcing the person to do things they have a right not to do, or preventing things they have a right to do, by fear: “if you leave I’ll have you deported,” “if you call your sister I’ll take the kids.”

Reproductive coercion — pressuring pregnancy, sabotaging contraception, controlling access to reproductive health information, or controlling pregnancy outcomes through force, threat, or intimidation.

The cases show how trial courts go wrong and how appellate courts correct them. In Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, decided before the statute named coercive control, the trial court denied an order after focusing on the absence of recent physical violence and disregarding evidence of monitoring, isolation, and verbal abuse; the Court of Appeal reversed. In Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, the trial court treated the husband’s control of his wife’s money, car, phone, and communications as “marital problems”; the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was coercive control under § 6320(c) and that treating it as marital discord was legal error. In Parris J., a five-year order was affirmed on coercive control alone — engineered financial dependence, threats, emotional abuse, litigation against the petitioner’s father, letters to her employer — with no physical violence.

The limiting word is “unreasonably.” Every example in the statute is prefaced by “unreasonably engaging in.” A couple’s agreement that one partner handles the bills is not financial control; asking a partner to text when they arrive is not monitoring; a joint decision to move for a job is not isolation. The pattern must unreasonably interfere with free will and liberty, and in a contested case the respondent’s account of why the conduct was reasonable, mutual, or agreed is the heart of the defense.

What does not count as abuse

The definition is broad, and some petitions are filed on the theory that anything hurtful qualifies. The courts have drawn lines, and respondents should know them.

A single upsetting post or message. In Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, the restraining order rested principally on one private Facebook post in which the respondent accused the petitioner of abuse. The post was not sent to the petitioner or shared with third parties. The Court of Appeal reversed: the post did not destroy her mental or emotional calm, and the trial court had wrongly shifted the burden to the respondent on a disputed physical incident. The court wrote that the DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes between former couples. Curcio is the first case a respondent’s lawyer reaches for when the petition describes hurt feelings rather than abuse.

Badgering and ordinary conflict. In S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, the Court of Appeal reversed an order where the respondent had badgered the petitioner and would not leave her alone during a dispute over their child, but the conduct the trial court relied on did not rise to abuse under the statute. Arguments, raised voices, insults, and the unpleasantness of a relationship ending are not, without more, abuse. The question is always whether the conduct destroyed the petitioner’s emotional calm or merely upset them — a real distinction the statute’s word “destroys” was chosen to mark.

Conduct with a legitimate purpose. Communicating with a co-parent about the children’s school, medical care, or exchange schedule is not abuse because the other parent dreads the messages. Filing for divorce or custody is not abuse. Responding to a court filing is not abuse. Retrieving one’s own property through counsel or a civil standby is not abuse. The line is crossed when the lawful form hides an abusive purpose — litigation used to exhaust and intimidate, as in Parris J.; welfare checks called to harass, as in Jan F.; “co-parenting” messages that are really a stream of insults.

Accidents and self-defense. Discussed above. Neither is abuse, and § 6305 protects a person who acted primarily in self-defense from a mutual order.

Conduct the petitioner did not experience as destroying their calm. Because the test is the effect on the petitioner, evidence that the petitioner continued to initiate friendly contact, made plans with the respondent, or described the relationship positively during the period of alleged abuse is relevant — though Vinson v. Kinsey holds that continued contact does not by itself negate abuse, and courts are alert to the reality that people stay in contact with abusers for many reasons.

Fear that is not reasonable or not of serious injury. Under § 6203(a)(3), subjective anxiety about a person who has done nothing threatening is not abuse. It may be relevant to renewal of an existing order under Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, but it does not support a new one.

How much proof is needed

A temporary restraining order may issue on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” shown by the petitioner’s declaration alone, without notice to the respondent (Fam. Code § 6300). At the hearing, the petitioner must prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence — more likely than not. The testimony of a single witness, including the petitioner, is enough to support a finding if the judge believes it (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818). There is no corroboration requirement, no requirement of a police report, and no requirement of physical evidence.

The abuse does not have to be recent. Family Code § 6301(d) states that the length of time since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative, and directs the court to consider the totality of the circumstances. A judge who denies an order because the last incident was “too long ago” has applied the wrong test.

The abuse does not have to be a crime. Coercive control, disturbing the peace, and unwanted contact are not crimes under the Penal Code, whose definition of abuse in § 13700 is far narrower than the Family Code’s. Conversely, conduct that is a crime — a battery, a criminal threat — is abuse under the Family Code whether or not it is ever charged.

The court may not deny an order simply because the parties are in a divorce or custody dispute. In In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115, the Court of Appeal reversed a denial on exactly that ground, holding that a court may deny a temporary order on the totality of the circumstances only if it states that reason, and may not deny because the dispute arises in family-law litigation. At the same time, the timing and context of a petition are evidence a respondent may put before the court on credibility.

For respondents: when the conduct alleged is not abuse

Most people served with a DVRO request assume the fight is about whether the petitioner is telling the truth. Often it is. But in a large share of cases the strongest defense concedes much of the petitioner’s account and asks the court to apply the statute to it. This defense has advantages: it does not require the judge to call the petitioner a liar, it is grounded in law the judge must follow, and it preserves the respondent’s credibility for the facts that are genuinely disputed.

The analysis follows the categories above. Does the petition allege intentional or reckless physical contact, or an accident, or mutual physical conduct in which the respondent was defending himself or herself? Does it allege a threat that would reasonably cause fear of serious injury given the actual history between the parties, or an angry remark with nothing behind it? Does it allege contact that continued after a clear request to stop, or a handful of messages in the ordinary aftermath of a breakup? Does it allege a pattern of unreasonable control, or a household in which finances and schedules were managed jointly, with disagreements? Does it allege conduct that destroyed the petitioner’s calm, or conduct the petitioner found disappointing, embarrassing, or infuriating? Is the “harassment” actually co-parenting communication or litigation conducted properly?

The evidence that wins these arguments is the complete record. The petition will present a curated set of messages; the respondent should present the whole thread, including the petitioner’s replies, the petitioner’s own initiations of contact, and the context around each quoted line. Where the petition alleges control, the respondent’s evidence of shared decision-making — joint accounts both used, trips the petitioner took alone, friends the petitioner saw — answers it. Where the petition was filed in the middle of a custody or divorce dispute, the timing is admissible on motive and credibility, even though it is not by itself a ground for denial.

Four rules apply to every respondent. File the response, Form DV-120, before the hearing, and appear; a default order can last five years and will carry the firearm prohibition, the custody presumption, and a CLETS entry. Obey the temporary order to the letter while the case is pending, because violating it is a crime under Penal Code § 273.6 and is itself abuse under N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595. Do not contact the petitioner to “work it out,” even through friends; indirect contact is enjoined. And if a criminal case arising from the same facts is pending or possible, coordinate the restraining order defense with the criminal defense, because testimony at the DVRO hearing can be used in the criminal case. The firm’s Fighting a False Domestic Violence Restraining Order page covers the full defense, and the California Restraining Order Hearing page explains how the hearing runs.

For petitioners: proving abuse under the statute

A petition succeeds when it connects specific facts to specific categories of the statute, so the judge can see the legal basis for each order requested. The strongest declarations identify each incident by date and place; quote what was said rather than characterizing it; describe what the petitioner did and felt in response; and attach the corroboration that exists — screenshots of complete message threads with dates visible, call logs, voicemails, photographs of injuries or damage, medical or police records if any, and declarations from witnesses who saw or heard the conduct.

For coercive control, the pattern is the proof. A timeline that shows, over months, how money was controlled, how movements were tracked, how contact with family was cut off, and how threats were used to enforce compliance tracks the statute’s own structure and gives the court the totality of the circumstances it must consider. Financial records, phone-account records, and location-sharing histories are often available and often decisive.

For disturbing the peace, the declaration should describe the effect on the petitioner concretely — sleep, work, health, the steps taken to avoid the respondent — because the test is whether the conduct destroyed the petitioner’s calm, not whether it would have bothered someone else. The Judicial Council’s self-help guide to domestic violence restraining orders explains the forms (DV-100, DV-109, DV-110); the firm’s Domestic Violence Temporary Restraining Order page explains the first step, and the Emergency Protective Order page explains what police can do tonight.

Why the definition matters so much: the consequences of a finding

A finding of abuse under § 6203 is not a judgment about who was the better partner. It carries fixed legal consequences, which is why both sides should insist that the court apply the statute precisely. A person found to have committed abuse must relinquish all firearms and ammunition within 24 hours and may not possess them while the order is in effect (Fam. Code § 6389), with a parallel federal prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). If the parties share children, the finding triggers the rebuttable presumption under Family Code § 3044 that awarding custody to that parent is detrimental to the child, with a five-year lookback — see Domestic Violence Restraining Order and Child Custody in California. The order is entered in the statewide CLETS database, appears in background checks, and can affect professional licenses, housing, and immigration status. And the order can last five years and be renewed for five more or permanently without any new abuse, on a showing of reasonable apprehension of future abuse (Ritchie v. Konrad; § 6345) — see Permanent Domestic Violence Restraining Order.

Abuse under the Family Code compared with other California definitions

The Family Code definition is the broadest of the four, and the difference from the civil harassment standard is why the relationship question matters: the same twelve unwanted texts can be abuse under the DVPA between former partners and fall short of harassment under CCP § 527.6 between former roommates, because the civil harassment statute requires a course of conduct, no legitimate purpose, and distress a reasonable person would suffer, proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Civil Harassment Restraining Order hub explains that standard.

How the Restraining Order Law Firm approaches the abuse question

On the respondent side, which is the larger part of our practice, the first thing we do with a new petition is sort every allegation into a statutory category — or out of all of them. Allegations that fall outside the definition are the subject of a legal argument the judge must engage with; allegations that fall inside it are the subject of a factual defense built on the complete record. On the petitioner side, we draft declarations that track the statute, so the judge is never left to guess which category a fact fits, and we assemble the pattern evidence that coercive-control cases require. On both sides, because the firm is a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C. and handles criminal defense, we coordinate the restraining order case with any criminal exposure the same facts create.

The firm represents petitioners and respondents in domestic violence restraining order matters in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura Counties, from offices at 835 Wilshire Blvd., Floor 5, Los Angeles 90017 and 695 Town Center Dr., #1200, Costa Mesa 92626. Call (888) 808-2179. If you are in immediate danger, call 911 first, then visit our 24/7 emergency help page.

Frequently asked questions

The Restraining Order Law Firm is a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C. This page is attorney advertising and general information about California law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statutes, forms, and deadlines change — verify all references with counsel before relying on them. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.