Family Code § 6320: Conduct a California Domestic Violence Restraining Order Can Prohibit — Including Disturbing the Peace and Coercive Control

By Matthew Barhoma, Esq. — California State Bar No. 319339 | Last updated: November 2026

California Family Code section 6320 lists the conduct a court may prohibit in a domestic violence restraining order and, through Family Code section 6203(a)(4), defines the outer boundary of “abuse” under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Subdivision (a) authorizes a court to enjoin a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating, falsely personating, harassing, telephoning, destroying personal property, contacting directly or indirectly, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party. Subdivision (c) defines “disturbing the peace of the other party” as conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party, and states that it includes coercive control — a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty. The section was most recently amended by SB 50, effective January 1, 2026, to add internet-connected devices to the means by which the peace may be disturbed. Because any conduct a court “could” enjoin under § 6320 is abuse, this section — not § 6203 — is where most contested domestic violence restraining order cases in California are actually decided. This page is part of the California Restraining Order Laws library maintained by the Restraining Order Law Firm. Call (888) 808-2179 for a confidential consultation.

Family Code § 6320 at a glance

The text of Family Code § 6320

The current text of Family Code section 6320, as amended by SB 50 effective January 1, 2026, reads as follows.

(a) The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members.

(b) On a showing of good cause, the court may include in a protective order a grant to the petitioner of the exclusive care, possession, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent. The court may order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.

(c) As used in subdivision (a), “disturbing the peace of the other party” refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any method or through any means including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, including connected devices as defined in Section 22948.30 of the Business and Professions Code, or other electronic technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty. Examples of coercive control include, but are not limited to, unreasonably engaging in any of the following:

(1) Isolating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support.

(2) Depriving the other party of basic necessities.

(3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services.

(4) Compelling the other party by force, threat of force, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or suspected immigration status, to engage in conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage.

(5) Engaging in reproductive coercion, which consists of control over the reproductive autonomy of another through force, threat of force, or intimidation, and may include, but is not limited to, unreasonably pressuring the other party to become pregnant, deliberately interfering with contraception use or access to reproductive health information, or using coercive tactics to control, or attempt to control, pregnancy outcomes.

(d) This section does not limit any remedies available under this act or any other provision of law.

The official text is published by the Legislative Counsel at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.

What § 6320 means in plain English

Section 6320 does two jobs. On its face, it is a list of things a judge can order a restrained person not to do. But because Family Code § 6203(a)(4) defines abuse to include “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320,” the list also works backward: if a judge could prohibit the conduct, then doing it was abuse, and abuse is the basis for the order. The result is that § 6320 is simultaneously the remedy and a large part of the definition.

Most of the acts listed in subdivision (a) are self-explanatory and overlap with crimes: attacking, striking, battering, stalking, threatening, sexual assault, destroying property, impersonation, harassing phone calls. Three terms carry most of the weight in contested hearings because they reach conduct that is not necessarily criminal:

• “Harassing.” The Family Code does not define it in this section. Courts have read it in light of its ordinary meaning and the civil-harassment definition in Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6, without importing that statute’s stricter requirements.
• “Contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise.” Unwanted contact after a relationship has ended — repeated texts, calls, emails, messages through friends, showing up at a home or workplace — is independently enjoinable, which is why a no-contact order can issue even where no single message was threatening.
• “Disturbing the peace of the other party.” This is the catch-all, and subdivision (c) now defines it. The remainder of this page is largely about those words.

Subdivision by subdivision

(a) The enumerated acts and protection of family or household members

Subdivision (a) authorizes an ex parte order — one issued on the petitioner’s papers alone, without notice to the respondent — enjoining any of the listed acts. The same conduct may be enjoined after notice and hearing under § 6340. The subdivision ends with the authority to extend protection, on a showing of good cause, to “other named family or household members,” which is how a petitioner’s children, new partner, parents, or roommates come to be listed as additional protected persons on Form DV-110 and DV-130.

The good-cause standard for adding protected parties is not demanding. In J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, the Court of Appeal held that a finding that the additional person’s safety would otherwise be jeopardized is relevant but not required. In M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, substantial evidence that the respondent had enlisted the children in stalking and harassing the petitioner, together with physical violence toward the children, supported including them as protected parties. And in K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, the court held that children who witness a parent’s abuse may themselves have their peace disturbed within the meaning of subdivision (c), and reversed a trial court that had limited its inquiry to whether the children had been directly abused.

(b) Animals

Subdivision (b) lets the court give the petitioner exclusive care, possession, or control of any animal kept by either party or a child in the household, and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and not to take, transfer, hide, harm, or dispose of it. The provision exists because threats to pets are a recognized means of controlling a partner. Judicial Council Form DV-100 includes a specific request for animal protection.

(c) “Disturbing the peace” and coercive control

Subdivision (c) was added by SB 1141 (Stats. 2020, ch. 248), effective January 1, 2021, and has been amended three times since. It does four things.

It defines disturbing the peace. The phrase “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” The language is taken almost verbatim from In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, discussed below. “Totality of the circumstances” was the Legislature’s instruction that no single act is to be judged in isolation; the history between the parties, the context of the conduct, and its cumulative effect all count.

It covers indirect conduct and technology. The conduct “may be committed directly or indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any method or through any means,” including telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, and other electronic technologies. A respondent who sends messages through a mutual friend, posts about the petitioner online, or uses a shared account to monitor the petitioner is within the statute. The reference to “internet-connected devices, including connected devices as defined in Section 22948.30 of the Business and Professions Code” was added by SB 50 (Stats. 2025, ch. 676), effective January 1, 2026, in response to abusers using smart-home systems, vehicle apps, location trackers, and shared accounts to surveil and control partners. The same bill created a process under the Business and Professions Code for a protected person to ask a connected-device provider to cut off an abuser’s access.

It brings coercive control inside the definition. Disturbing the peace “includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” Three features of this sentence matter in practice. “Pattern” means coercive control is proven by accumulation; a single controlling act is rarely enough. “In purpose or effect” means the petitioner need not prove the respondent intended to control — the effect on the petitioner’s liberty is sufficient. “Unreasonably” is the limiting word; it is what separates a partner who asks where the other is going from one who tracks their movements, and a household budget from financial control.

It lists five examples of coercive control. The list is expressly non-exhaustive. The five are isolation from friends, relatives, or other sources of support; deprivation of basic necessities; controlling, regulating, or monitoring movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services; compelling conduct by force, threat of force, or intimidation, including threats based on immigration status; and reproductive coercion. The immigration-status language was added by later amendment, and reproductive coercion was added by SB 374 (Stats. 2021, ch. 135), effective January 1, 2022.

(d) No limit on other remedies

Subdivision (d) preserves every other remedy available under the DVPA or any other law. An order under § 6320 does not foreclose a move-out order under § 6321, custody orders under § 6323, or a civil action for damages.

The amendment history of § 6320(c)

The statute’s recent history explains why older web pages, and some trial-court rulings, misstate the current law.

A page or court filing that describes § 6320(c) without coercive control is describing law that ended in 2020. One that omits reproductive coercion is describing law that ended in 2021. One that omits connected devices is describing law that ended in 2025.

How California courts apply § 6320

Nadkarni: the origin of “destroys the mental or emotional calm”

In In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, a former wife alleged that her ex-husband had accessed her private email account, read her messages, and disclosed them to others, including in court filings. The trial court dismissed her request for a restraining order on the ground that the conduct was not abuse. The Sixth District reversed. Reading “disturbing the peace” according to its plain meaning, the court held that the phrase means conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party, that it is not limited to physical conduct, and that the ex-husband’s alleged conduct could qualify. Nadkarni is the most-cited DVPA decision in California, and the Legislature adopted its definition word for word in 2020.

Burquet: unwanted contact after a breakup

In Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, a former boyfriend continued to text, email, and call the petitioner with messages carrying sexual innuendo after she told him to stop, and then came to her home and refused to leave. There was no violence and no explicit threat. The Second District affirmed the restraining order, adopting Nadkarni‘s reading and rejecting the argument that “disturbing the peace” should be limited to the narrower Penal Code meaning of the phrase. Burquet is the authority for the proposition that persistent, unwanted contact after a relationship ends is itself abuse.

Evilsizor and Altafulla: disclosure of private information

In In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, a husband downloaded his wife’s text messages and disclosed them in court filings and to others. The First District held that the disclosure could be disturbing the peace regardless of whether the data had been lawfully acquired, and rejected the husband’s First Amendment challenge to the resulting order. Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571 reached a similar result where a partner distributed a surveillance report about the petitioner to her family and coworkers. Together with Nadkarni, these cases establish that weaponizing a partner’s private communications or information is abuse under § 6320.

Rodriguez and Hatley: controlling conduct is not a “marital problem”

In Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, decided five years before coercive control entered the statute, the trial court denied a restraining order after focusing on the absence of recent physical violence and disregarding evidence that the respondent monitored the petitioner’s calls and classes, isolated her, and verbally abused her. The Second District reversed, holding that the controlling and emotionally abusive conduct was abuse under the DVPA. In Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, decided after SB 1141, the trial court treated the husband’s control of his wife’s money, vehicle, phone, and communications as “marital problems” and limited its inquiry to physical violence. The Fourth District reversed, holding that the conduct fell squarely within § 6320(c) and that treating it as mere marital discord was legal error.

Parris J.: coercive control without violence, and the petitioner’s perspective

Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108 is among the first published decisions to affirm a five-year domestic violence restraining order based on coercive control with no physical violence. The evidence included engineered financial dependence, threats, emotional abuse, litigation against the petitioner’s father, letters to her employer, and the respondent’s maintenance of a large life-insurance policy on her. The respondent argued that courts must apply an objective reasonable-person standard to “disturbing the peace.” The Second District rejected the argument: the statute asks whether the conduct destroyed the other party’s mental or emotional calm, judged on the totality of the circumstances. The court also affirmed a $200,000 attorney’s-fee award.

Vinson: threats, continued contact, and the whole record

In Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, the trial court denied a restraining order after effectively requiring the petitioner to show she feared physical injury and discounting her claim because she had continued to communicate with the respondent. The First District reversed, holding that threats are abuse under § 6320(a) whether or not the petitioner feared bodily injury, that continued contact does not negate abuse, and that the trial court had taken too limited a view of the conduct the DVPA covers while failing to weigh the totality of the circumstances as Family Code § 6301(d) requires.

N.T. v. H.T.: violating a temporary order is itself abuse

In N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, the Court of Appeal held that a respondent’s violation of a temporary restraining order — contacting the petitioner in defiance of the order — was itself conduct that disturbed her peace and could support issuance of the order after hearing. The practical lesson for respondents is absolute: obey the temporary order completely, even if the allegations are false.

Recent decisions: context is not a reason to deny

Two 2025 decisions address trial courts that denied orders because the allegations arose in family-law disputes. In In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115, the Fourth District held that a petitioner’s declaration and messages made a prima facie showing of disturbing the peace, that a court may deny a temporary order on the totality of the circumstances only if it states that reason, and that it may not deny solely because the dispute arises in a family-law context. In X.K. v. M.C. (2025, First District, No. A170020), the court reversed a denial where the trial judge had applied an incorrect definition of abuse and treated the custody dispute as a reason to doubt the allegations, holding that disturbing the peace is itself a broad category of abuse and that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including conduct that occurred outside California.

The limits of § 6320: what courts have refused to enjoin

The breadth of subdivision (c) is real, but so are its limits, and respondents’ counsel should know them as well as petitioners’ counsel knows Nadkarni.

One private post. In Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, the Second District reversed a restraining order based principally on a single private Facebook post accusing the petitioner of abuse. The post was not sent to the petitioner and not shared with third parties. The court held that it did not rise to the level of destroying her mental or emotional calm, faulted the trial court for shifting the burden to the respondent on a disputed physical incident, and wrote that the DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes between former couples. Curcio is the leading authority for the proposition that upsetting is not the same as abusive.

Badgering that stops short of abuse. In S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, the Fourth District reversed an order where the respondent had badgered the petitioner and refused to leave her alone during a dispute over their child, but the conduct the trial court relied on did not amount to abuse under the statute.

Conduct with a legitimate purpose. Nothing in § 6320 enjoins lawful conduct undertaken for a legitimate reason: communicating about a child’s medical care, responding to a court filing, or collecting one’s own property through proper channels. The line is crossed when the lawful form is used for an abusive purpose — litigation as harassment, as in Parris J., or repeated welfare-check calls to police made to harass a parent, as in Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583.

“Unreasonably.” Every example of coercive control in subdivision (c) is prefaced by “unreasonably engaging in” the listed conduct. A couple’s agreement that one partner manages the finances is not coercive control. Asking a partner to check in when traveling is not monitoring. A respondent who can show that the alleged control was mutual, consensual, or reasonable in context has a defense the statute itself supplies.

Mutual conflict. Where both parties engaged in the conduct, Family Code § 6305 forbids a mutual order unless each party filed their own request on the mandatory form and the court makes detailed findings that both acted as primary aggressors and neither acted primarily in self-defense. In Isidora M. v. Silvino M. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 11, the Court of Appeal reversed a mutual order where the trial court had substituted one party’s guilty plea for the required findings.

§ 6320 compared with Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6

The civil harassment statute has no equivalent of “disturbing the peace,” and the difference decides cases.

The same conduct — a dozen unwanted texts after a breakup — can therefore support a DVRO between former dating partners but fail as a CHRO between former roommates. For petitioners, this is why identifying the correct relationship under Family Code § 6211 is the first step. For respondents facing a DVRO, it means the civil-harassment defenses of “no pattern” and “no reasonable person would be distressed” are not available in the same form, and the defense must instead engage § 6320(c) on its own terms: the conduct did not destroy the petitioner’s calm, the control alleged was not unreasonable, or the conduct had a legitimate purpose.

Who § 6320 applies to

An order under § 6320 may be sought by any person in a relationship with the respondent listed in Family Code § 6211 — spouses and former spouses, cohabitants and former cohabitants, current and former dating or engagement partners, co-parents, children of a party, and relatives by blood or marriage within the second degree. A minor 12 or older may file without a guardian ad litem under Code of Civil Procedure § 372(b). The order may extend to other named family or household members on good cause.

Using § 6320: the petitioner’s side

A petitioner relying on disturbing the peace or coercive control should plead the pattern, not just the worst day. A declaration that lists each instance of monitoring, isolation, financial control, or unwanted contact by date, describes the effect on the petitioner, and attaches corroboration — screenshots, call logs, account records, witness declarations — tracks the statute’s own structure and gives the court the “totality of the circumstances” it is required to consider. Where connected devices are involved, the 2026 amendment makes clear that evidence of location tracking, smart-home manipulation, or shared-account surveillance is evidence of abuse. The firm’s Domestic Violence Restraining Order hub explains the forms and process.

Defending against § 6320: the respondent’s side

A respondent’s defense under § 6320 is usually built on one or more of five arguments, each grounded in the statute or the cases above. First, the conduct alleged does not destroy anyone’s mental or emotional calm — it is the ordinary friction of a relationship or its ending (Curcio; S.M. v. E.P.). Second, the control alleged was not “unreasonable” — it was mutual, agreed, or proportionate to legitimate concerns such as a shared child’s safety or shared finances. Third, the conduct had a legitimate purpose — co-parenting communication, litigation conducted properly, retrieval of property through counsel. Fourth, the petitioner’s account is not credible or is contradicted by the full record: the complete message thread rather than a curated screenshot, the petitioner’s own contemporaneous conduct, the timing of the petition relative to a custody or divorce filing. Fifth, where both parties behaved badly, § 6305 bars a mutual order without the required findings, and the respondent’s own conduct in self-defense is not abuse.

Three practical rules apply. File the response (Form DV-120) and appear; a default order can last five years. Obey the temporary order to the letter; a violation is a crime under Penal Code § 273.6 and is itself abuse under N.T. v. H.T. And treat the hearing as the trial it is: live testimony, cross-examination, and admissible evidence decide these cases. The firm’s Fighting a False Domestic Violence Restraining Order and California Restraining Order Hearing pages cover the defense in depth.

Related statutes

• Family Code § 6203 — the definition of abuse, which incorporates § 6320 through subdivision (a)(4).
• Family Code § 6211 — the relationships required for a domestic violence restraining order.
• Family Code § 6218 — defines “protective order” to include orders under §§ 6320, 6321, and 6322.
• Family Code § 6300 — the “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” standard.
• Family Code § 6301(d) — the totality-of-the-circumstances rule.
• Family Code § 6305 — limits on mutual orders.
• Family Code § 6321 — residence exclusion (move-out) orders.
• Family Code § 6322 — orders enjoining other behavior necessary to effectuate §§ 6320 and 6321.
• Family Code § 6340 — orders after notice and hearing, and adding protected parties on good cause.
• Family Code § 6345 — duration and renewal.
• Family Code § 6389 — firearm prohibition.
• Business and Professions Code § 22948.30 et seq. — connected-device protections added by SB 50.
• Penal Code §§ 528.5, 529, 653m — the impersonation and harassing-call offenses referenced in subdivision (a).
• Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 — the civil harassment statute.

The practical side

For how § 6320’s terms are proven and disputed at a hearing, see What Counts as Abuse Under Family Code 6203, which covers each category of conduct with examples, and the Domestic Violence Restraining Order hub. For the relationship requirement, see Who Can Get a Domestic Violence Restraining Order.

The Restraining Order Law Firm, a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C., represents petitioners and respondents in domestic violence restraining order matters in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura Counties, from offices in Los Angeles and Costa Mesa. Call (888) 808-2179.

Frequently asked questions about Family Code § 6320

The Restraining Order Law Firm is a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C. This page is attorney advertising and general information about California law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statutes, forms, and deadlines change — verify all references with counsel before relying on them. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.