Family Code § 6203: California’s Definition of Abuse for Domestic Violence Restraining Orders

By Matthew Barhoma, Esq. — California State Bar No. 319339 | Last updated: November 2026

California Family Code section 6203 defines “abuse” for purposes of a domestic violence restraining order. Under the statute, abuse means any of four things: (1) intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury; (2) sexual assault; (3) placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another; or (4) engaging in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined under Family Code section 6320 — a list that includes stalking, threatening, harassing, contacting, and “disturbing the peace of the other party,” which the Legislature has defined to include coercive control. Section 6203(b) states that abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault. The petitioner must prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether the conduct alleged fits one of these four categories is the central question in nearly every contested domestic violence restraining order hearing in California, and it is the first question a respondent’s defense should examine. This page is part of the California Restraining Order Laws library maintained by the Restraining Order Law Firm; for the practical side — proving or disputing abuse at a hearing — see What Counts as Abuse Under Family Code 6203. Call (888) 808-2179 for a confidential consultation.

Family Code § 6203 at a glance

The text of Family Code § 6203

The current text of Family Code section 6203 reads as follows.

(a) For purposes of this act, “abuse” means any of the following:

(1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury.

(2) Sexual assault.

(3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another.

(4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.

(b) Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.

The official text is published by the Legislative Counsel at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov. Subdivision (b) was added by the Legislature in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to make explicit what the courts had already held: that the Domestic Violence Prevention Act reaches conduct well beyond physical violence.

What § 6203 means in plain English

Section 6203 is a definition, not a remedy. It does not tell a court what to order; it tells the court what kind of conduct can justify an order at all. A judge deciding a request for a domestic violence restraining order asks two threshold questions. First, is the relationship between the parties one of the six listed in Family Code § 6211? Second, does the conduct alleged fit one of the four categories in § 6203? If the answer to either question is no, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act does not apply, however troubling the conduct may be, and the petitioner’s remedy, if any, lies under a different statute such as Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.

The four categories are not equal in how often they matter. Categories (1), (2), and (3) describe what most people picture when they hear “domestic violence”: hitting, sexual assault, and threats that put someone in fear of serious injury. Category (4) is different in kind. Rather than describing conduct, it points to another statute — Family Code § 6320 — and says that anything a court could enjoin under that section is abuse. Because § 6320 includes “disturbing the peace of the other party,” and because the Legislature has defined that phrase to cover coercive control, category (4) is where the great majority of contested cases are decided. A petition that alleges no physical violence at all can succeed under § 6203(a)(4); a petition that alleges physical violence will usually also allege conduct under (a)(4).

Category by category: the four definitions of abuse

(a)(1) Intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury

The first category covers physical violence: hitting, pushing, grabbing, choking, kicking, throwing objects, or any other act that causes or is meant to cause bodily injury. Three features of the text matter.

“Bodily injury” is not qualified. The statute does not require serious injury, visible injury, or medical treatment. A bruise, a scratch, or pain without a mark is bodily injury. This is a lower threshold than the “traumatic condition” required for a felony conviction under Penal Code section 273.5, and it is one reason a restraining order can issue on facts that would not support a criminal charge.

“Attempt” is enough. A swing that misses, a push that is blocked, or a thrown object that lands wide is an attempt to cause bodily injury and satisfies the definition without any injury at all.

“Recklessly” reaches conduct without intent to harm. A person who acts with conscious disregard of a substantial risk of injury — driving dangerously with a partner in the car during an argument, for example, or shoving past someone on a staircase — may have committed abuse even without meaning to hurt anyone. Accidental contact, by contrast, is neither intentional nor reckless and does not qualify.

(a)(2) Sexual assault

The second category is a single phrase. Sexual assault within a domestic relationship is abuse, and the Domestic Violence Prevention Act does not require a criminal charge, a conviction, or a police report. The Family Code does not define “sexual assault” in this section, and courts generally look to the Penal Code’s sexual-offense provisions for its meaning. Marriage is no defense; spousal rape is a crime in California and is abuse under the DVPA.

(a)(3) Placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury

The third category covers threats of violence that put the other person in fear. Each word carries weight.

“Reasonable apprehension” is an objective standard. The question is not only whether the petitioner was afraid but whether a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would have been. Context matters: the same words from a person with a history of violence toward the petitioner may be reasonably frightening where they would not be from a stranger.

“Imminent” means the feared injury is close at hand, not speculative or distant. A statement that the respondent “will get” the petitioner someday is less likely to qualify under this category than a raised fist during an argument — though it may well qualify as “threatening” under § 6320 and therefore as abuse under (a)(4).

“Serious bodily injury” sets a higher bar than category (1). The fear must be of significant harm, not of a slap.

“To that person or to another” means a threat to harm the petitioner’s child, parent, or new partner can be abuse of the petitioner.

(a)(4) Any behavior that has been or could be enjoined under § 6320

The fourth category is the broadest and the most litigated. It makes abuse of any conduct a court “could” enjoin under § 6320 — a hypothetical test that does not require the conduct to have been enjoined already. Section 6320(a) lists that conduct: molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating, falsely personating, harassing, telephoning (including annoying calls under Penal Code § 653m), destroying personal property, contacting either directly or indirectly, coming within a specified distance, and disturbing the peace of the other party.

Of these, “disturbing the peace” has done the most work. In In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, the Court of Appeal held that the phrase means conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party, and that a former husband’s accessing and disclosing his ex-wife’s private emails could qualify. The Legislature codified that definition in 2020, effective January 1, 2021, and added that disturbing the peace includes coercive control — a pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty, including isolating the person, depriving them of basic necessities, controlling their movements, communications, finances, or access to services, compelling conduct through force or intimidation (including immigration-based threats), and reproductive coercion. The full text and analysis of that provision are on the Family Code § 6320 page.

(b) Abuse is not limited to physical injury or assault

Subdivision (b) is a rule of construction aimed at trial courts. It instructs judges not to deny a restraining order simply because the petitioner was never hit. Appellate courts have reversed trial judges who did exactly that. In Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, the trial court denied a restraining order after focusing on the absence of recent physical violence and discounting evidence of the respondent’s controlling and emotionally abusive conduct; the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the mental and emotional abuse was itself abuse under the DVPA. In Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, the Court of Appeal reversed a denial where the trial judge had treated the husband’s control of his wife’s money, car, phone, and communications as “marital problems” rather than coercive control under § 6320(c).

Who § 6203 applies to

Section 6203 defines abuse in the abstract; it becomes “domestic violence” only when directed at a person in a relationship listed in Family Code § 6211: a spouse or former spouse, a cohabitant or former cohabitant, a current or former dating or engagement partner, a co-parent, a child of a party, or any other person related by blood or marriage within the second degree. The same conduct directed at a neighbor, coworker, or stranger is not “domestic violence,” and the petitioner must proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, which defines “harassment” more narrowly and requires clear and convincing evidence.

A petitioner may also seek protection for others. Under Family Code § 6320(a), a court may extend an order to other named family or household members on a showing of good cause, and under § 6340 the court may add protected parties on the same showing. In Gou v. Xiao (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 812, the Court of Appeal held that a parent may seek a domestic violence restraining order based on the other parent’s abuse of their child, because abuse of the child can also constitute abuse of the parent. In K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, the court held that children who witness a parent’s abuse may have their own peace disturbed within the meaning of § 6320(c), and that a trial court errs by limiting its inquiry to whether the children were themselves physically or sexually abused.

How California courts apply § 6203

The standard of proof and the “reasonable proof” rule

A temporary restraining order may issue, with or without notice to the respondent, on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” shown by the petitioner’s affidavit or testimony (Fam. Code § 6300). The court may issue the temporary order based solely on the petitioner’s declaration. At the hearing on the order after hearing, the petitioner must prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence — more likely than not. The testimony of a single witness, including the petitioner, can be substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818).

Totality of the circumstances; the age of the abuse

Family Code § 6301(d) directs the court to consider the totality of the circumstances and provides that the length of time since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative. A trial court that denies an order because the abuse happened “too long ago,” or because the petitioner continued to have contact with the respondent, has applied the wrong test. In Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, the Court of Appeal reversed a denial where the trial judge had effectively required the petitioner to show fear of physical injury, discounted her continued contact with the respondent, and failed to weigh the whole record; the court described the trial judge’s approach as too limited a view of the conduct the DVPA covers.

The petitioner’s perspective, not a “reasonable person” test

For conduct under § 6320’s “disturbing the peace” clause, the question is whether the conduct destroyed the petitioner’s mental or emotional calm, assessed under the totality of the circumstances. In Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, the respondent argued that courts must apply an objective reasonable-person standard; the Court of Appeal rejected that argument and affirmed a five-year order based on coercive control without any physical violence. Category (a)(3), by contrast, uses the word “reasonable” and does import an objective standard.

Context cuts both ways: family-law disputes

Courts may not deny a request solely because the allegations arise in a divorce or custody dispute. In In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115, the Court of Appeal reversed the denial of a temporary order, holding that a court has discretion to deny a temporary order based on the totality of the circumstances only if it states that reason, and may not deny simply because the parties are in family-law litigation. At the same time, the fact that a petition was filed in the middle of a custody fight is relevant evidence a respondent may put before the court on the questions of credibility and motive.

What is not abuse under § 6203

The definition is broad, but it has edges, and appellate courts have enforced them. For respondents, these cases are the foundation of the most common defense: that the conduct alleged, even if it happened, is not abuse as the Legislature defined it.

A single upsetting communication that does not destroy emotional calm. In Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, the petitioner obtained a restraining order based principally on a single private Facebook post in which the respondent accused her of abuse. The Court of Appeal reversed. The post was not sent to the petitioner or shared with third parties, and the court held it did not rise to the level of destroying her mental or emotional calm. The opinion also faulted the trial court for shifting the burden to the respondent on a disputed physical incident. The court observed that the Domestic Violence Prevention Act was not enacted to address all disputes between former couples — a sentence respondents’ counsel quote often, and for good reason.

Ordinary conflict, rudeness, and badgering. Arguments, raised voices, and unkind words are features of many relationships and their endings. In S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, the Court of Appeal reversed a restraining order where the evidence showed the respondent had badgered the petitioner and refused to leave her alone during a dispute about their child, but had not engaged in conduct the court found to rise to the level of abuse. The line between badgering and harassment or disturbing the peace is fact-specific, but it exists, and the petitioner bears the burden of showing the conduct crossed it.

Conduct with a legitimate purpose. Contacting a co-parent about a child’s schedule, communicating through counsel in litigation, or exercising a legal right is not abuse because the other party finds it stressful. The DVPA does not enjoin lawful, purposeful conduct merely because a relationship has soured — though repeated contact that exceeds any legitimate purpose, or litigation and communications used as a weapon, can cross into abuse, as Parris J. illustrates.

Accidents and self-defense. Category (a)(1) requires intent or recklessness. Conduct that is accidental is not abuse. Conduct undertaken in reasonable self-defense is not abuse by the person defending; Family Code § 6305 forbids mutual orders unless the court finds that both parties acted as primary aggressors and neither acted primarily in self-defense.

Fear that is not reasonable or not of serious injury. Under (a)(3), the petitioner’s fear must be reasonable and must be of imminent serious bodily injury. Subjective anxiety about a person who has done nothing threatening does not satisfy this category, though it may be relevant to a renewal under Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 if an order already exists.

§ 6203 compared with other definitions in California law

The word “abuse” and the phrase “domestic violence” appear in several California codes, and they do not mean the same thing. Confusing them is a common error in online summaries, including some written by lawyers.

Three differences stand out. First, the Family Code definition is far broader than the Penal Code’s: § 13700 has no equivalent of § 6203(a)(4), so coercive control and disturbing the peace are abuse under the DVPA but are not, by themselves, crimes. Second, the civil harassment definition requires a “course of conduct” (a pattern), a lack of legitimate purpose, and distress that a reasonable person would suffer — none of which § 6203 requires — and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance. The same facts can therefore support a DVRO against an ex-partner but not a CHRO against a neighbor. Third, a finding of abuse under § 6203 carries consequences the other definitions do not: the rebuttable presumption against custody under Family Code § 3044, the firearm prohibition under § 6389, and entry into the statewide CLETS database.

Proving abuse under § 6203: the petitioner’s side

A petitioner proves abuse by tying specific facts to a specific category. The strongest declarations identify each incident by date and place, describe what was said and done in the respondent’s own words where possible, state how the petitioner reacted and why, and attach corroboration: text messages, emails, voicemails, photographs of injuries or property damage, medical or police records, and declarations of witnesses. For coercive control under (a)(4), the pattern is the proof; a timeline that shows control over money, movement, communications, and relationships over months is more persuasive than any single episode. The Judicial Council’s self-help guide to domestic violence restraining orders describes the forms (DV-100, DV-109, DV-110) and the filing process; the firm’s Domestic Violence Restraining Order hub explains the process from the petitioner’s point of view.

Disputing abuse under § 6203: the respondent’s side

A respondent who has been served has a right to file a response (Form DV-120), to appear at the hearing, to testify, to present evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine the petitioner. The definitional defense — that the conduct alleged is not abuse — is available in a large share of cases and is often the strongest, because it does not require the court to disbelieve the petitioner. It requires the court to apply the statute.

The analysis proceeds category by category. Does the petition allege an intentional or reckless act causing or attempting bodily injury, or an accident or mutual physical contact? Does it allege a threat that would put a reasonable person in fear of imminent serious injury, or an angry remark with no history to make it credible? Does it allege conduct that destroyed the petitioner’s emotional calm, or a breakup that was painful in the ordinary way — a few unwanted messages, a single social-media post, a disagreement over a child’s schedule? Does the alleged pattern of control actually exist, or is the petition recasting the ordinary friction of a shared household and shared finances as coercive control? Curcio, S.M. v. E.P., and § 6305’s treatment of self-defense are the authorities for these arguments.

Two cautions for respondents. First, the defense must be made on the merits, at the hearing, with evidence; a respondent who does not file a response and does not appear risks an order entered by default for up to five years. Second, the temporary order must be obeyed completely while the case is pending, even if the allegations are false. Violating a temporary order is a crime under Penal Code section 273.6, and under N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, a violation of a temporary order can itself be abuse that supports the final order. The firm’s Fighting a False Domestic Violence Restraining Order page and the California Restraining Order Hearing page cover the defense in detail.

Related statutes

• Family Code § 6320 — the conduct a court may enjoin, incorporated into § 6203 by subdivision (a)(4); includes the statutory definitions of “disturbing the peace” and coercive control.
• Family Code § 6211 — the relationships that make abuse “domestic violence.”
• Family Code § 6300 — the “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” standard for issuing an order.
• Family Code § 6301(d) — the totality-of-the-circumstances rule and the rule that the age of the abuse is not by itself determinative.
• Family Code § 6305 — the limits on mutual restraining orders and the treatment of self-defense.
• Family Code § 3044 — the rebuttable presumption against custody for a parent found to have committed domestic violence.
• Family Code § 6389 — the firearm prohibition that follows a domestic violence restraining order.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 — the civil harassment statute that applies when no § 6211 relationship exists.
• Penal Code § 13700 — the narrower criminal-law definition of “abuse.”
• Penal Code § 273.6 — the crime of violating a protective order.

The practical side

This page explains the statute. For how the definition is argued at a hearing — the evidence that proves each category, the arguments that defeat a petition, and how the firm approaches both — see What Counts as Abuse Under Family Code 6203 and the Domestic Violence Restraining Order hub. For the relationship question that precedes the abuse question, see Who Can Get a Domestic Violence Restraining Order.

The Restraining Order Law Firm, a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C., represents petitioners and respondents in domestic violence restraining order matters in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura Counties, from offices in Los Angeles and Costa Mesa. Because the firm also handles criminal defense, it coordinates the restraining order case with any parallel criminal charge arising from the same facts. Call (888) 808-2179.

Frequently asked questions about Family Code § 6203

The Restraining Order Law Firm is a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C. This page is attorney advertising and general information about California law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statutes, forms, and deadlines change — verify all references with counsel before relying on them. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.