Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6: California’s Civil Harassment Restraining Order Statute

By Matthew Barhoma, Esq. — California State Bar No. 319339 | Last updated: November 2026

California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 is the statute that authorizes a civil harassment restraining order. It allows any person who has suffered “harassment” to obtain a temporary restraining order and, after a hearing, an order lasting up to five years. The statute defines harassment as unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person and serves no legitimate purpose. At the hearing, the petitioner must prove harassment by clear and convincing evidence, the highest burden in California civil restraining order law. A judge rules on the temporary order the same day the petition is filed, the hearing is held within 21 days (25 for good cause), and the respondent is entitled to one continuance as a matter of right. An order prohibits firearms, is enforced under Penal Code section 273.6, and can be renewed for up to five more years. Section 527.6 does not apply to cases covered by the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, so it is the statute for neighbors, coworkers, roommates, acquaintances, and strangers. This page is part of the California Restraining Order Laws library maintained by the Restraining Order Law Firm. Call (888) 808-2179 for a confidential consultation.

CCP § 527.6 at a glance

The definitions: the text of § 527.6(b)

Every civil harassment case is decided under the definitions in subdivision (b). The four that matter most read as follows.

(1) “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”

(2) “Credible threat of violence” is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.

(3) “Harassment” is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

(7) “Unlawful violence” is any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.

The official text is published by the Legislative Counsel at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov. The remaining definitions identify the “petitioner” as the person to be protected, the “respondent” as the person to be restrained, and describe what a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing may contain.

What § 527.6 means in plain English

Section 527.6 gives a person who is being harassed a fast, simplified court procedure to obtain an injunction. It is a civil statute. It does not punish past behavior, award damages, or decide who was right in a dispute. In Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, the California Supreme Court described it as an expedited procedure for limited injunctive relief against threatened future harm, one that “is not intended to punish the restrained party for past acts of harassment.”

Three ideas organize the statute.

There are three ways to prove harassment. Unlawful violence (an assault, a battery, or stalking). A credible threat of violence. Or a course of conduct, a pattern of acts, that meets five further requirements: it was knowing and willful, directed at a specific person, seriously alarming, annoying, or harassing, without legitimate purpose, and distressing both to a reasonable person and to the petitioner in fact. Our guide to what counts as harassment under CCP 527.6 takes each element in turn.

The burden is high. A judge may issue an order only on clear and convincing evidence, proof that makes the facts highly probable. A domestic violence restraining order requires only a preponderance.

The order looks forward. Because the remedy is an injunction, the court must find a reasonable probability that the harassment will continue or recur. In Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, the Court of Appeal reversed an order based on a single battery because the trial court had not found a threat of future harm: “An injunction is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur.”

Subdivision by subdivision

(a) Who may file, and where

Any person who has suffered harassment may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing. Since January 1, 2025 (SB 554), the statute states expressly that a petitioner “need not be a resident of the state,” and that the petition may be filed in the county where the petitioner lives or is temporarily located, where the respondent lives, where the conduct occurred, or in any other court with jurisdiction. A minor under 12 may appear through a guardian ad litem without a lawyer.

The petitioner must be a natural person. A business cannot be a civil harassment petitioner; an employer protecting employees uses the workplace violence statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8.

(b) Definitions

Quoted above. Subdivision (b)(6) lists what an order may do: enjoin a party from “harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning … destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the petitioner,” and make orders protecting the petitioner’s animals. It also allows any further order “necessary to effectuate” those terms. The statute authorizes no custody, visitation, support, or move-out orders.

(c) Protecting family and household members

On a showing of good cause, the order may include other named family or household members of the petitioner. Good cause must be shown for each added person; a respondent can contest it.

(d), (e), and (f) The temporary restraining order

A temporary restraining order may issue, with or without notice to the respondent, on a declaration that shows “reasonable proof of harassment of the petitioner by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to the petitioner.” The request must be granted or denied the day it is submitted, or the next court day if it is filed late in the day. The temporary order lasts up to 21 days, or 25 if the hearing is extended, and stays in effect through any continuance.

A temporary order is decided on one side’s papers under a low standard. It is not a finding that harassment occurred, and many petitions that receive a temporary order are denied at the hearing.

(g) The hearing date

The hearing must be held within 21 days of the ruling on the temporary order, or 25 days if the court finds good cause. If no temporary order was requested, the clock runs from the filing date.

(h) The response and the cross-petition

The respondent “may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment, or may file a cross-petition.” The response is filed on Judicial Council Form CH-120. Filing is optional, but a written response is the judge’s first view of the defense, and it is where a respondent requests attorney’s fees. A respondent who wants an order against the petitioner must file a separate cross-petition; a judge cannot restrain the petitioner on the response alone.

(i) The hearing and the burden of proof

Subdivision (i)(1) contains the two rules that define a civil harassment hearing:

At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.

Relevant testimony must be received. A court may not decide a contested petition on the declarations alone if a party offers relevant oral testimony (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719). Because the judge receives “any testimony that is relevant,” hearsay may be considered (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717), though its weight is for the judge.

Clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the question is whether the record contains substantial evidence from which the judge could have found harassment highly probable (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, applied to civil harassment orders in E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688).

Remote appearances. Under subdivision (i)(2), added by AB 561, commencing January 1, 2027 a party or witness may appear remotely at the hearing, and the court may not charge a fee for it.

(j) Duration, renewal, modification, and termination

An order after hearing may last up to five years. If the form does not state an expiration date, the order lasts three years. It may be renewed for up to five additional years “without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the original order,” on a request made within the three months before it expires.

Three decisions shape this subdivision.

• Renewal is discretionary. In Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, the court held that renewal “is not automatic”; the trial court must decide whether there is a reasonable probability the wrongful acts will recur.
• A second renewal needs more. In Leahy v. Peterson (2023), the Fourth District held that the statute did not authorize a second five-year renewal without a showing of new harassment, and that filing a lawsuit is protected activity that cannot supply it.
• The restrained person can ask to end or change the order. In Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, the court held that a trial court has discretion to modify or terminate a civil harassment order when it finds no reasonable probability of future harm, and reversed the denial of a grandfather’s request.

Under (j)(3), a restrained person who moves to modify or terminate must give the protected person notice by personal service.

(k) and (l) Lawyers and support persons

Either side may be represented by a lawyer or appear without one. Where violence or a credible threat is alleged, a support person may accompany a party and sit at counsel table if the party is unrepresented, but may not give legal advice or prompt the party.

(m) Service

The respondent must be personally served with the petition, any temporary order, and the notice of hearing at least five days before the hearing, unless the court shortens time. If the petitioner shows a diligent effort to serve and reason to believe the respondent is evading service or cannot be located, the court may authorize another method “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” (added by AB 1143 in 2021). An order entered after defective alternative service is open to reversal.

(n) The warning in the notice of hearing

The notice of hearing must tell the respondent that if the respondent does not attend, the court may make orders “that could last up to five years.” That is what happens: a respondent who was served and does not appear is usually restrained for the full term on the petitioner’s evidence alone.

(o) and (p) Continuances

The respondent “shall be entitled, as a matter of course, to one continuance, for a reasonable period, to respond to the petition.” No showing of good cause is needed for the first one. Either side may obtain further continuances for good cause. The temporary order stays in effect until the continued hearing ends unless the court orders otherwise.

(q) and (r) Service of the order and entry in CLETS

A respondent who was in court when the order was made needs no further service. If the respondent was served with the temporary order and did not appear, and the final order’s terms are identical apart from duration, the order may be served by mail. The court transmits every order to the Department of Justice for entry in the California Restraining and Protective Order System.

(s) Attorney’s fees

The prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.

The fee provision runs both ways. In Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, the Court of Appeal held that a prevailing respondent may recover fees in the court’s discretion, without showing that the petition was frivolous or brought in bad faith. This is a sharp contrast with domestic violence cases, where a prevailing respondent recovers fees only on proof that the petition was frivolous or filed to abuse, intimidate, or delay (Fam. Code § 6344).

(t) Violations

Willful disobedience of a temporary order or an order after hearing is punishable under Penal Code § 273.6: a misdemeanor carrying up to one year in county jail and a fine of up to $1,000, with greater penalties for violations causing injury and for repeat violations. See violating a California restraining order.

(u) Firearms

A person subject to a civil harassment order “shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order is in effect.” The court must order relinquishment under Code of Civil Procedure § 527.9, which requires the restrained person to surrender or sell firearms within 24 hours of service and file a receipt within 48 hours. Possession is separately punishable under Penal Code § 29825. The prohibition applies to temporary orders as well as orders after hearing.

(v) Minors’ confidential information

A minor, or the minor’s guardian, may ask the court to keep the minor’s identifying information confidential. Unauthorized disclosure is punishable by a sanction.

(w) Cases the statute does not cover

This section does not apply to any action or proceeding covered by Title 1.6C (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code or by Division 10 (commencing with Section 6200) of the Family Code. This section does not preclude a petitioner from using other existing civil remedies.

Division 10 of the Family Code is the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. A dispute between spouses, former partners, cohabitants, co-parents, or close relatives belongs under that Act, not § 527.6. The California courts’ self-help guide puts it practically: civil harassment orders are for people such as neighbors, landlords, coworkers, and more distant relatives. See DVRO vs. civil harassment restraining order. The Civil Code reference excludes debt collection disputes governed by the Rosenthal Act.

(x) Mandatory forms

Petitions and responses must be on Judicial Council forms: CH-100 (request), CH-109 (notice of hearing), CH-110 (temporary restraining order), CH-120 (response), CH-130 (order after hearing), CH-200 (proof of personal service), CH-600 (request to modify or terminate), CH-700 (request to renew), and CH-800 (firearms receipt). An order is not unenforceable merely because it was not issued on the approved form.

(y) and (z) Fees and electronic filing

There is no filing fee for a petition alleging that the respondent inflicted or threatened violence, stalked the petitioner, or placed the petitioner in reasonable fear of violence, and no fee for the response to such a petition or for subpoenas. In those cases the sheriff or marshal serves the papers at no charge. Other petitions carry the standard civil filing fee unless a fee waiver is granted. Commencing January 1, 2027, every court must accept civil harassment petitions and related filings electronically.

How courts have interpreted § 527.6

The appellate decisions below are the ones cited most often in civil harassment hearings and appeals.

How a petitioner proves a case under § 527.6

A petition succeeds when the evidence is specific, corroborated, and tied to the statutory words.

• Choose the theory. Violence, a credible threat, or a course of conduct. Each has different elements, and a declaration should say which applies.
• Date every incident. A course of conduct is a series of acts. A dated list of what happened, where, and how it was communicated is the backbone of the case.
• Corroborate. Clear and convincing evidence usually means something beyond the petitioner’s word: complete message threads, call logs, video, photographs, police reports, and witnesses with no stake in the dispute.
• Prove distress. The petitioner must have actually suffered substantial emotional distress. Testimony about lost sleep, changed routines, security measures, or treatment is evidence of it.
• Show it will continue. Recent incidents, escalation, statements of intent, and violations of the temporary order all bear on the likelihood of recurrence.
• Ask for the right relief. Stay-away distances and locations should match the facts. Overbroad terms invite a narrower order or a reversal.

Our petitioner’s guide covers filing step by step.

How a respondent defeats a case under § 527.6

The statute supplies most of the defenses. A respondent’s preparation should test the petition against each one.

• No course of conduct. One incident, or unrelated incidents with no continuity of purpose, is not a course of conduct (Leydon).
• Legitimate purpose. Conduct with a legitimate purpose is not harassment, even if unwelcome: collecting a debt lawfully, communicating about shared property, using an easement, reporting to authorities, serving legal papers (Byers).
• Constitutionally protected activity. Speech on public matters, petitioning the government, and litigation activity are excluded from “course of conduct” by the statute’s own terms (Hansen; Leahy). Where the petition targets protected activity, an anti-SLAPP motion is available (Thomas v. Quintero).
• No substantial emotional distress. Annoyance and irritation are not enough. The distress must be substantial, both to a reasonable person and to the petitioner (Schild).
• No likelihood of recurrence. Where the parties no longer have contact, a move or job change has separated them, or the incident was isolated, the forward-looking requirement is not met (Russell).
• The evidence is not clear and convincing. Where the case is one person’s word against another’s, with no corroboration, the burden is not carried.
• Wrong statute. If the parties are former partners or close relatives, § 527.6 does not apply by its own terms (subdivision (w)).
• Procedural defects. Service fewer than five days before the hearing, or alternative service without a diligent-effort showing, are grounds for a continuance or to vacate an order.

A respondent should also use the tools the statute provides: the one continuance as of right under (o), the written response under (h), and the fee request under (s). Our respondent’s guide covers the first 72 hours after service, and the hearing guide explains how testimony and exhibits work.

Recent and upcoming changes to § 527.6

Related statutes

• Family Code § 6211 lists the relationships that move a case out of § 527.6 and into the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.
• Family Code § 6203 and § 6320 define abuse for domestic violence orders.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8 is the parallel statute for workplace violence restraining orders, filed by employers.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 527.9 governs firearm relinquishment under civil harassment orders.
• Penal Code § 273.6 makes a violation a crime.

How the Restraining Order Law Firm handles § 527.6 cases

The firm tries civil harassment cases on both sides throughout Southern California. For respondents, its results include civil harassment petitions denied after trial at the Palm Springs, Corona, and Long Beach courthouses and in Orange County Superior Court, including one where a temporary order had already issued; two related petitions dismissed through trial at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse; and dismissals at the Central Justice Center in Santa Ana, in Moreno Valley after multiple hearings, and in Whittier. For petitioners, the firm obtained the renewal of a civil harassment order in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The firm appears in every courthouse in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura Counties, from offices at 835 Wilshire Blvd., Floor 5, Los Angeles 90017 and 695 Town Center Dr., #1200, Costa Mesa 92626. See our main guide to civil harassment restraining orders.

Frequently asked questions

Consult With a Restraining Order Lawyer Today

Section 527.6 is short on time and exacting on proof: a hearing in about three weeks, a clear and convincing burden, and an order that can last five years. If you have been served with a civil harassment petition, or need to file one, call (888) 808-2179 or request a confidential consultation with the Restraining Order Law Firm. We will measure the petition against each element of the statute and tell you what we would do before the hearing. If the situation is urgent, our 24/7 emergency help line is available now.

The Restraining Order Law Firm is a d/b/a of Barhoma Law, P.C. This page is attorney advertising and general information about California law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statutes, forms, and deadlines change — verify all references with counsel before relying on them. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.